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Abstract— Deep learning has become an increasingly com-
mon technique for various control problems, such as robotic
arm manipulation, robot navigation, and autonomous vehicles.
However, the downside of using deep neural networks to learn
control policies is their opaque nature and the difficulties of
validating their safety. As the networks used to obtain state-
of-the-art results become increasingly deep and complex, the
rules they have learned and how they operate become more
challenging to understand. This presents an issue, since in
safety-critical applications the safety of the control policy must
be ensured to a high confidence level. In this paper, we propose
an automated black box testing framework based on adversarial
reinforcement learning. The technique uses an adversarial
agent, whose goal is to degrade the performance of the target
model under test. We test the approach on an autonomous
vehicle problem, by training an adversarial reinforcement
learning agent, which aims to cause a deep neural network-
driven autonomous vehicle to collide. Two neural networks
trained for autonomous driving are compared, and the results
from the testing are used to compare the robustness of their
learned control policies. We show that the proposed framework
is able to find weaknesses in both control policies that were
not evident during online testing and therefore, demonstrate a
significant benefit over manual testing methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of deep learning has resulted in rapid progress
in many fields, with state-of-the-art results obtained in fields
such as image classification, sound recognition, and language
processing [1]–[3]. The strong capability of Deep Neural
Networks (DNNs) for modelling highly non-linear and com-
plex functions has resulted in the adoption of DNNs in many
control problems. Important results in control applications
such as robotic arm manipulation, robot navigation, and
autonomous vehicle control have been achieved through deep
learning [4]–[10]. However, in safety-critical applications,
the safety of the control policy must be fully guaranteed be-
fore it is commercially deployable. This presents a significant
obstacle to the deployment of DNN-based control policies
in safety-critical applications such as autonomous driving
[11], [12]. As the operational environment of the system
becomes increasingly complex, it becomes infeasible to test
the control policy in all possible scenarios it may encounter
[13]–[16]. Therefore, methods for testing and understanding
the safety of these opaque systems are necessary [17]–[20].
Moreover, in tasks such as autonomous driving, testing the
system in a naturalistic driving environment would mean that
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edge cases where collisions are more likely to occur, would
be seen rarely [21]. Therefore, by using an adversarial agent
whose aim is to deliberately create these edge case scenarios,
better insights into possible failure cases can be obtained with
reduced training times.
The concept of utilising an adversarial agent to disturb
a machine learning agent has been suggested previously,
for example, by Morimoto & Doya [22], who used an
actor-disturbor-critic method, where the disturbor aimed to
find the worst disturbance to reduce the performance of a
controller. This was used in the training loop of a rein-
forcement learning agent to improve the robustness of the
control policy to disturbances, and was demonstrated in an
inverted pendulum task. The framework was extended to use
DNNs for estimating the control policy and disturbances
in a deep reinforcement learning framework by Pinto et
al. [23], and was demonstrated successfully in a robotic
manipulation task. For autonomous vehicles, the idea of
learning to automatically find failure cases was suggested
as early as 1992, by Schultz et al. [24], who used genetic
algorithms to find test cases that exposed weaknesses in
autonomous aerial vehicle controllers. The results suggested
this could be an effective alternative to manual testing of
complex software controllers. In more recent work, Behzadan
& Munir [25] demonstrated that a reinforcement learning
agent could be trained to create collisions with other road
vehicles, by training an agent to collide against two agents,
a DNN and a rule-based system. The number of episodes to
convergence and minimum time-to-collision were then used
to argue the DNN was the safer control policy. However, by
having no constraints on the adversarial agent it is likely to
learn a behaviour unlike any human driver, which could limit
insights into plausible collision cases that might happen if the
DNN control policies were deployed in the real world. For
instance, in the examples shown by Behzadan & Munir [25],
the adversarial agent approached the target vehicle from the
rear at high velocity, making collision avoidance extremely
difficult. Moreover, this type of collision does not necessarily
represent a vulnerability in the control policy under test, as
the adversarial agent would be considered at fault in a real
world collision [26]. Perhaps the closest work to our research
is Adaptive Stress Testing (AST) by Koren et al. [27]. AST
aims to find the most likely collision cases for an autonomous
vehicle by manipulating the actions of pedestrians in the
simulation environment and the noise in the observations
of the control policy under testing. However, this approach
has several weaknesses which limit the insight it can offer
into the vulnerabilities in the autonomous system under
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testing. For example, in majority of the collisions found,
the blame for the collision would fall on the pedestrians
controlled by AST. Furthermore, the AST framework was
only evaluated on a simple rule-based vehicle following
system. Instead, in our approach there are constraints on
the behaviour of the adversarial agent to maintain plausible
driving trajectories and the focus is to find vulnerabilities
which lead to collisions where the autonomous vehicle being
tested is at fault. Moreover, the observations of the system
under testing are not manipulated in any way, therefore all
collision cases found by the proposed framework demon-
strate a vulnerability in the learned deep control policy.
In this paper, we propose a technique for targeted black
box testing, using a reinforcement learning algorithm to
find the test scenarios which are most likely to cause the
black box control policy to fail. The proposed system has
no knowledge of the internal mechanisms of the control
policy under testing, but instead learns a behaviour which
finds failure cases for the control policy. In this way, the
powerful function approximation capabilities of DNNs are
used to find the weaknesses in other DNNs, and the testing
procedure can therefore be fully automated. The proposed
framework is tested in an autonomous driving problem,
where the Adversarial Reinforcement Learning (ARL) agent
is attempting to cause a vehicle following model to crash.
Note that our approach is distinct to work on adversarial
attacks [28]–[30], as we are not manipulating the inputs
to the target DNN, instead we place another agent in the
same environment which aims to deliberately cause the target
control policy to fail. Similarly, our approach is distinct to
research into adversarial robustness [31]–[33], as we do not
aim to train the model to be robust to adversarial examples,
instead we aim to leverage the adversarial agent to find
failure cases in the target models more reliably than manual
testing methods can, and understand the weaknesses present
in the deep control policies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section II presents the necessary background, methodology,
and general framework behind ARL. The simulations results
of the vehicle following use case are presented in Section
III. Finally, concluding remarks are given in Section IV.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. Markov Decision Processes
Reinforcement learning allows an agent to learn through
interaction with its environment. Reinforcement learning can
be formally described by a Markov Decision Process (MDP),
denoted by a tuple {S,A,P,R}, where S represents the
state space,A represents the action space, P denotes the state
transition probability model, and R is the reward function.
At each time step t, the agent observes state st ∈ S and takes
an action at ∈ A, according to its policy pi(st), causing the
environment to transition to the next state st+1 according to
the transition dynamics p(st+1|st, at) as given by the transi-
tion probability model P . The agent then receives a reward
rt, according to the reward function R, and observes the
new state of the environment st+1. The network parameters
are then updated, such that the expected future rewards are
maximised. As the agent interacts with the environment it
learns through trial-and-error a state-action mapping for an
optimal policy pi∗(st), which maximises the discounted sum
of rewards over time given by the returns Rt. Therefore, this
exploration of the operational environment can be leveraged
to explore potential weaknesses in black box systems.
Rt =
∞∑
k=0
γkrt+k (1)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor used to prioritise
immediate rewards over future rewards.
B. Reinforcement Learning
In our framework, the algorithm used to train the adversar-
ial agent is Advantage Actor Critic (A2C) [34], which uses
an actor-critic network architecture, as shown in Fig. 1. The
actor network estimates the optimal policy function pi∗(st),
which aims to maximise the expected rewards. Meanwhile,
the critic network estimates the value of being in a given
state, with the Value function V (s). The weights of both
networks are then updated based on the Advantage function
A(st, at):
V (s) = E[Rt|st = s] (2)
Q(s, a) = E[Rt|st = s, a] (3)
A(st, at) = Q(st, at)− V (st)
≈
n−1∑
k
γkrt+k + γ
nV (st+n)− V (st) (4)
Where E denotes expectation, V (st) is the value function,
and Q(st, at) is the quality function estimating the value of
each action for a given state [35], [36].
Fig. 1: An actor-critic network architecture. The dashed lines
represent network updates [37].
The network architectures for both networks are as fol-
lows. The actor network has 3 fully-connected layers, fol-
lowed by a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) [38] layer,
which is fully connected to the output layer. The actor
network estimates the stochastic control policy with two
outputs, mean value µ and estimated variance σ2, which are
used to generate a Gaussian distribution N from which the
action is sampled, such that a ∼ N (µ, σ2). Meanwhile, the
critic network uses only 2 fully-connected layers followed
by the output layer to estimate the value function V (s). All
hidden neurons use a ReLU-6 activation [39], whilst the µ
TABLE I: Final network hyperparameters.
Parameter Value
No. hidden layers (actor) 3
No. neurons per hidden layer (actor) 50
No. of LSTM units (actor) 16
No. hidden layers (critic) 2
No. neurons per hidden layer (critic) 50
Learning rate (actor), ηactor 1x10-4
Learning rate (critic), ηcritic 1x10-2
Discount factor, γ 0.99
Entropy coefficient, β 1x10-4
RMSProp  1x10-10
RMSProp decay α 0.9
RMSProp momentum 0.0
uses a tanh activation, the σ2 uses a softplus activation, and
the value estimate has a linear activation.
A2C training is formulated as in [37], by updating the
actor and critic networks in separate update steps, using a
policy loss Lpi and value loss Lv functions, respectively, as
given by:
Lv = (A(st, at))2 (5)
Lpi = −logpi(at|st)A(st, at)− βH(pi(st)) (6)
where β is the entropy coefficient and H(pi(st)) is the en-
tropy added to encourage exploration in the policy, calculated
as
H(pi(st)) =
1
2
(log(2piσ2) + 1) (7)
Both networks are updated using RMSProp optimiser [40]
during training, using their respective loss functions. The
final hyperparameters of the network architecture are shown
in Table I.
C. Training Environment
The autonomous driving simulation was defined as a vehi-
cle following scenario in highway driving. Two vehicles are
driving at highway speeds on a straight road. The follower is
a DNN trained to follow a leading vehicle at a safe distance,
whilst the lead vehicle is the adversarial agent whose aim
is to find weaknesses in the follower’s control policy. In
order to do this, the adversarial agent must create collisions,
thus proving the follower’s control policy is unsafe. For this
scenario, the input to the ARL network are the follower
vehicle velocity vf , follower vehicle acceleration af , relative
velocity to the follower vrel, and time headway between the
two vehicles th, such that sARLt = [vf , af , vrel, th]. The
output of the network is the lead vehicle acceleration for
the next time step. The simulation time steps are fixed at 40
ms.
We demonstrate this framework by attacking two previ-
ously published DNN models trained for vehicle following
using the IPG CarMaker simulator [41], (1) a Reinforcement
Learning (RL) model [37] and (2) an Imitation Learning (IL)
model [42]. The RL model uses a feedforward network with
an LSTM layer to control the longitudinal actions of the
vehicle using the observations sRLt = [vf , af , vrel, th]. The
IL model uses a simple feedforward network to also control
the longitudinal actions of the vehicle, using the observations
sILt = [vf , vrel, th]. Both models aim to maintain a 2 s time
headway th from the lead vehicle. The time headway is a
measure of intervehicular distance in time, given as follows:
th =
xrel
vf
(8)
where xrel is the relative distance between the two vehicles
in m, and vf is the velocity of the following vehicle in m/s.
The training was broken down into 5-minute episodes,
where the episode ends after the 5 minutes have passed or a
collision occurs. At the start of each episode, a road friction
coefficient CoF ∈ {0.4, 0.425, ... , 1.0} was randomly
chosen. It should be noted that a collision may be easier to
cause in low friction conditions as the reaction time required
for the follower vehicle reduces [43], however none of the
agents can observe the road friction coefficients and should
therefore learn a policy which generalises to different road
conditions. The reward function R for training the ARL
agent was given based on the time headway:
R = min
(
1
th
, 100
)
(9)
Thus, the reward function rewards low time headways,
encouraging collisions to occur. The reward is capped at 100,
as otherwise the reward function would tend towards infinity
as the time headway reaches zero.
The velocity and the acceleration of the lead vehicle were
limited to ensure that the vehicle behaviour remains plausible
and the velocity is in the highway driving range, as well as
to obtain insights into the effect of the driving speeds on the
robustness of the vehicle following models. The acceleration
was always limited to alead ∈ [-6, 2] m/s2, whilst four
velocity ranges were tested as vlead ∈ [17, 30], [12, 35],
[12, 30], [17, 35] m/s. For each velocity constraint and
vehicle follower model combination, 5 training runs of 2,500
episodes were completed.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Results
The average number of collisions and episodes until first
collision for each velocity range and vehicle follower model
can be seen in Tables II and III, respectively. In initial testing,
the lead vehicle was limited to vlead ∈ [17, 30] m/s. Since the
vehicle following models were trained in this velocity range,
it tests their robustness in their training domain. The ARL
agent was then trained for 2,500 episodes against both agents,
for which the results can be seen in Fig. 2(a). The results
demonstrate the IL model is susceptible to an adversarial
agent, and thus the ARL agent can cause collisions to occur.
On the other hand, the RL model has zero collisions with
the ARL agent, and as can be seen from Fig. 2(a) the
minimum time headway in the episodes remains near the
target headway of 2 s. This shows a significant benefit of
the RL model over the IL one, in terms of robustness to an
adversarial agent. The second set of experiments, shown in
TABLE II: Average number of collisions for different lead
vehicle velocity constraints. Averaged over 5 training runs
of 2,500 episodes each.
vlead Imitation Learning Reinforcement Learning
[17, 30] m/s 486.6 0.0
[12, 35] m/s 644.0 2.0
[12, 30] m/s 799.6 0.0
[17, 35] m/s 315.2 1.2
TABLE III: Average number of episodes until first collision
found for different lead vehicle velocity constraints. Aver-
aged over 5 training runs of 2,500 episodes each.
vlead Imitation Learning Reinforcement Learning
[17, 30] m/s 563.2 0.0
[12, 35] m/s 579.2 922.3
[12, 30] m/s 245.3 0.0
[17, 35] m/s 1030.8 2451.0
Fig. 2(b), relaxed the velocity constraints on the lead vehicle,
to vlead ∈ [12, 35] m/s increasing the maximum velocity
and decreasing the minimum velocity. These velocity ranges
are outside the distribution the vehicle following models
experienced during training, and therefore also test model
generalisation capability. From the results, it can be seen
that both models are more susceptible to an attack in this
domain, but nevertheless the RL model still demonstrates
significant safety benefits over the IL model. The two last
velocity ranges tested were vlead ∈ [12, 35] and [17, 30] m/s,
relaxing the minimum and maximum lead vehicle velocity
constraints, respectively. The results can be seen in Fig.
2(c) and (d). Comparing the two sets of experiments, it can
be seen that relaxing the minimum velocity and allowing
the lead vehicle to drive at lower speeds enables it to find
collision cases more easily. In both cases, collision cases
against the IL model are found. However, the results from
Tables II and III show that the ARL is able to exploit the
IL model significantly more often and earlier in its training.
On the other hand, the RL model only collides in the higher
velocity experiments, although this occurs relatively rarely
and only at the very end of the ARL agent’s training phase.
Further investigation into the type of behaviour the ARL
was adopting during training revealed that, for a single
training run, the ARL tends to converge to a singular type
of behaviour that leads to collisions and these behaviours
can vary significantly between different training runs. While
some differences in the converged behaviour of the agent can
be expected due to the variance in reinforcement learning
[44]–[47], these results show significant differences between
different trained agents. For instance, example collision sce-
narios are shown in Fig 3, where 2 collisions from 1 training
run are shown in the top subfigures, whilst 2 collisions from
another training run are shown in the bottom subfigures. For
consistency, both training runs are attacking the IL model,
with the same velocity constraints. As can be seen in the
first two plots, the ARL agent has adopted a strategy in
which it continuously accelerates and decelerates between
high and low velocities, until the follower vehicle comes
close to it with a high acceleration rate, at which point
the lead vehicle then decelerates at maximum deceleration.
Meanwhile, in the plots (c) and (d), the ARL agent has
adopted a strategy in which it first decelerates to a low
velocity, and once both vehicles are at low velocities it
starts to accelerate back to the maximum velocity, followed
by waiting until the following vehicle is approaching it at
high acceleration, when it finally decelerates and creates a
collision. These results reveal a flaw in the IL model, where
it continues to accelerate when the th > 2 s, trying to reach
the target th of 2 s, even if the lead vehicle is decelerating
and there is a large relative velocity difference between the
vehicles. Finding different collision modes is beneficial, as it
offers further insight into the different vulnerabilities present
in the control policy. Therefore, by exploiting information
from multiple training runs where the ARL is using different
collision modes, valuable insight into the weaknesses of the
DNN under testing can be obtained.
B. Discussion
The overall testing completed accounts for a total of
100,000 episodes, or over 8000 simulated hours of testing.
This resulted in a total of 11243 collision cases found,
which includes 11227 and 16 for the IL and RL mod-
els, respectively. This clearly demonstrates the significantly
higher robustness of the RL model to the presence of an
adversarial agent. Moreover, these results demonstrate that
the proposed ARL framework is able to find failure cases
for both control policies under testing. Compared to the type
of manual test case definition often used for vehicle safety
testing, this can be highly beneficial for testing complex
black box control systems. For instance, both control policies
tested here, were tested for 10 hours of simulated vehicle
following in their original works, where the lead vehicle also
drove at highway speeds. In this manual testing, the types
of trajectories executed by the lead vehicle were manually
defined (including both naturalistic driving and emergency
manoeuvrers), where the parameters (e.g. maximum velocity,
acceleration, time to execute manoeuvrer etc.) were ran-
domised during testing. The constraints on the lead vehicle
used in the manual test case definition were vlead ∈ [17, 40]
m/s and alead ∈ [−6, 2] m/s2, and road friction coefficient
was uniformly sampled from CoF ∈ [0.4, 1.0], representing
similar driving conditions to those in the adversarial testing
framework presented here. The results for these driving
tests are shown in Table IV and show that during normal
testing not a single collision was found. This demonstrates
how effective our ARL is at finding weaknesses in DNN-
based control policies. Indeed, the results from the manual
testing would suggest the IL model to be the safer control
policy. However, our testing framework exposes significant
vulnerabilities in the IL model, demonstrating that the RL
control policy is significantly more robust to the presence of
an adversarial agent.
(a) vlead ∈ [17, 30] m/s. (b) vlead ∈ [12, 35] m/s.
(c) vlead ∈ [12, 30] m/s. (d) vlead ∈ [17, 35] m/s.
Fig. 2: Comparison of the two vehicle following agents’ minimum th per episode over training runs. Averaged over 5 runs,
with standard deviation shown in shaded colour.
TABLE IV: 10-hour driving test with manually defined lead
vehicle trajectories.
Parameter Imitation Learning Reinforcement Learning
min. xrel 23.844 m 7.780 m
mean xrel 57.37 m 58.01 m
max. vrel 8.878 m/s 7.891 m/s
mean vrel 0.0197 m/s 0.0289 m/s
min. th 1.738 s 1.114 s
mean th 1.990 s 2.007 s
collisions 0 0
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, an automated testing framework for deep
neural networks was presented. The proposed framework
is based on adversarial reinforcement learning, where an
adversarial agent is placed in the same environment with
the system under testing. By training the adversarial agent
through reinforcement learning, the agent learns behaviours
which degrade the performance of the target system. This
general concept could be used to analyse vulnerabilities in
control policies used in multi-agent environments, such as
robotic manipulation or unmanned aerial vehicles. In our
work, the ARL approach was tested in an autonomous vehi-
cle use case, where the aim of the ARL agent was to cause
the vehicle behind it to collide into it. Two neural network
models trained for vehicle following were tested, one which
uses imitation learning and the other using reinforcement
learning. Both models had no collisions when manually
tested in their original works. The ARL agent was shown
to be able to learn a driving behaviour which can cause both
target models to collide into the lead vehicle. This in itself
demonstrates the significant benefit of this type of targeted
adversarial black box testing. Also, the results showed that
the reinforcement learning model is significantly more robust
to this kind of adversarial behaviour, demonstrating the
safety benefit of the reinforcement learning model over the
imitation learning model. This type of adversarial testing
framework provides an important technique for testing black
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3: Comparison of collision scenarios between training runs, (a) and (b) are from training run 1, whilst (c) and (d) are
from training run 2. Both training runs use velocity constraints of vlead ∈ [17, 30] m/s and the IL model as the vehicle
follower.
box control policies, and can be used to benchmark and
compare deep control policies as well as to gain additional
insights into the types of edge cases the policies are likely
to fail in.
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